

2012 年 3 月 22 日（木） 参議院外交防衛委員会にて外務、防衛両大臣の所信に対する質疑を行いました。

- ・資料 1（P2）
- ・資料 2（P3～9）
- ・資料 3（P10）
- ・資料 4（P11）

（資料名をクリックすると、ページへ移動します）

2003年8月にジュネーブ軍縮会議に提出した兵器用核分裂性物質生産禁止条約(FMCT)に関する作業文書の要旨(結論部分)

1. FMCTの関連問題の多様性・複雑性を考えると、交渉には幅広い技術的専門性と、困難な政治的判断を要する。軍縮会議の膠着を打開し、5年以内の終結を目標に交渉を開始することが緊急の優先課題である。
2. FMCTの関連問題は、3つ、即ち(1)条約の対象範囲、(2)検証を含む技術的検討、(3)組織的・法的事項に類型分けすることができる。将来の交渉のためには、これらを更に、法的・政治的事項と技術的事項に分けることができる。
3. シャノン・マンデート(1995年に合意済みの交渉マンデート)は、兵器用分裂性物質の生産禁止を求めるものであり、平和利用の核分裂性物質を禁止の対象からはずしていることは明白である。この問題が再度問われるべきではない。
4. 交渉は、将来の生産に焦点を当てた幅広い技術的検討を伴う。検証制度が作られなければならない。将来の生産禁止をストックの問題と結びつける交渉上の戦術は、無用に交渉を長引かせることとなり、核不拡散・核軍縮に対して有害である。技術問題は条約の枠組みが決まるまで議論できないというような主張は、適切ではない。
5. 検証制度については、包括的アプローチを取るべきか、限定的アプローチを取るべきかという重要だが難しい問題が存在する。この問題についての解答を見つけるためには、安全保障上の便益、秘密の保護、検証の実効性、コスト効率性等の要素について検討されなければならない。
6. 基本的には、包括的保障措置及び追加議定書により定められるIAEA保障措置が将来の検証制度の検討のための基礎となり得ると考えられる。原則的には、包括的保障措置及び追加議定書を締結している非核兵器国に対して、追加的義務が課されるべきではない。
7. 技術的検討の複雑性に鑑み、CTBTの検証制度についての技術的検討のために設置されたものと類似の専門家グループを設置するとの考えは、将来の交渉のための共通の知的基礎を整えるとの観点から、真剣な検討に値する。
8. 検証制度の交渉を促進する観点から、IAEAの経験、専門知識、インフラを、FMCTの枠組みと目的に適合する形で、十分活用することは有益である。組織事項については、FMCTの検証制度が将来的には、核軍縮を検証し、究極的に核兵器のない世界を確保するための組織になる可能性の観点からも、検討されるべきである。

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Original: ENGLISH

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**LETTER DATED 15 AUGUST 2003 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF JAPAN TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ADDRESSED TO THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF  
THE WORKING PAPER ON A TREATY TO BAN THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE  
MATERIAL FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE  
DEVICES**

I have the honour to forward herewith the text of the *Working Paper on a Treaty to Ban the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices* issued to the Conference on Disarmament on 14 August 2003 by the Japanese Delegation.

For the past decade, the FMCT has been the priority in multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation for the international community and will be more so in the future due to the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to States and non-state actors. Japan has been doing its utmost to promote this priority issue, and we hope that this working paper will provide a structure to facilitate understanding on related issues and provide a useful format for multilateral debate.

I would be very grateful if this working paper could be issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all member States of the Conference, as well as non-member States participating in its work.

(Signed): Kuniko INOUCHI, Ph.D.,  
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan  
to the Conference on Disarmament

GE.03-64023



Annex

Working Paper on a Treaty to Ban the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices

Submitted by Japan

**I. Introduction**

1. The Treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (the FMCT) has been the priority for the past decade in multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and in multilateral arms control fora as a whole. It still remains the priority despite a sea change in the international security and political landscape and will be more so due to the growing threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to States and non-state actors such as terrorists.
2. The FMCT will represent a significant step forward in the promotion of nuclear disarmament. A conclusion of the FMCT will be an essential building block towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. The FMCT will also contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation by banning globally the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of such material through its verification system.
3. The international community has, for the past decade, expressed its ardent desire for negotiations on many occasions and in many forums. Examples include:
4. The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/75/L adopted in December 1993 which recommended "the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices."
5. The "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation" adopted at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, which called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on the FMCT; this was widely regarded as part of a political bargaining process between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, when the latter abandoned the nuclear option forever as a means for national security;
6. The Final Document adopted at the 2000 NPT Review Conference which contained the "immediate commencement of negotiations" on the FMCT "with a view to their conclusion within five years" as one of the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraph 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament";
7. Annual consensus resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly since 2000 urging the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to agree on a program of work that includes FMCT negotiations; and



8. The Shannon Report (CD/1299), which included a mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and was adopted by the CD in March 1995. The CD actually commenced negotiations in 1998. Negotiations, however, were too short-lived to reach any tangible outcome.

9. The CD is still unable to start FMCT negotiations despite the political commitment continuously shown by the international community over the past decade, including those above-mentioned. This fact puts into question the relevance and usefulness of the CD as the only global forum to negotiate multilateral disarmament treaties. It is also a negative factor for the regime of the NPT.

10. The purpose of this paper is primarily to structure discussion on the FMCT by categorizing various issues according to the following items: (1) scope, (2) technical issues including verification and (3) organizational and legal issues. Individual issues can be identified through surveying the debate that has been held informally (and officially to a very limited extent) on the FMCT. Structuring and categorization of the issues will facilitate understanding on them, provide a useful format for future multilateral debate and thereby contribute to enhancing the level of discussion.

## **II. Scope**

### **Existing Stocks**

11. Future negotiators will have to define the scope of the FMCT. The best way to handle the question of existing stocks effectively is to start negotiations based on the Shannon report (CD/1299), which contains a mandate, but avoids precluding any delegation from raising the issue for consideration in the negotiations.

12. The issue of past production is arising from political will to make the FMCT more effective by enhancing transparency, or promoting reduction, of existing stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Thus, this question is a very controversial part of the entire debate and requires thorough examination.

13. Various suggestions have been made in the past on the modality to deal with the issue of stocks. Theoretically, there are several options, ranging from the total exclusion of existing stocks from the FMCT to the inclusion of legally binding provisions to eliminate them. As a middle way, Canada, for example, proposed in its working paper (CD/1578) "a separate but parallel process" to deal with this matter. Also, South Africa proposed in its working paper (CD/1671) "to ensure irreversibility" of material declared as excess by placing such material under a special verification arrangement until it becomes of a less sensitive form. Voluntary confidence-building measures with respect to the stocks may be considered to enhance transparency. Another interesting option would be to make such provisions in the FMCT, whether in the preamble or in the body, so as to keep open the way for a more substantive exercise to be conducted in the future.



14. Most importantly, deliberations on *future production* should be conducted without being linked to the issue of existing stocks, because such a linkage would only complicate the debate. Any tactics to link the two issues will unnecessarily prolong negotiations and therefore will not be useful, but rather harmful, to the entire negotiation process.

15. Japan is, at this stage, open on this matter to any suggestions that are conducive to further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and also to the facilitation of the FMCT negotiation process.

### **Fissile Material for Peaceful Purposes**

16. In relation to the scope, one view is that fissile material for the peaceful use of nuclear energy should be included in the scope of the prohibition under the FMCT. Japan neither does, nor will, accept such an argument because the negotiating mandate is crystal clear in defining the objective of the FMCT as the banning of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Japan opposes reopening this question, already settled in the negotiating mandate, because such a move would only complicate negotiations. Safeguarded peaceful uses of nuclear energy do no harm to the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

### **Examination of Fissile Material and Other Nuclear Materials**

17. Defining "fissile material" and other nuclear materials is of essential importance in determining the scope of the FMCT. The term "fissile material" is not used in the IAEA safeguards system, and therefore it is the right and the task of negotiators of the FMCT to decide on how to define this term.

18. Nonetheless, deliberations must, to a large extent, benefit from the experiences of the IAEA in its safeguards system. Nuclear materials that are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards comprise two mutually exclusive categories: special fissionable materials and source materials. According to the IAEA Statute, "special fissionable material" is mainly comprised of plutonium-239, uranium-233, and uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233.

19. Two transuranic elements, neptunium and americium, have fissionable capabilities. The Board of Governors of the IAEA indicated that some controlling measures might have to be applied to these two materials. In this regard, past discussions in the IAEA fora should be carefully followed.

20. Tritium is used as a booster for thermonuclear weapons and is therefore essential to increase the yield of warheads. However, tritium is neither a fissile material nor a nuclear material, and does not explode alone. The FMCT should focus on fissile material that is indispensable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

21. Thorium is a fertile material that can be converted to uranium-233. However, thorium itself is not directly usable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.



### III. Verification System

22. As for the verification system of the FMCT, two approaches, comprehensive and focused, have been proposed and discussed extensively. Although there is no precise understanding on these ideas and there are some variations on each, the comprehensive approach is generally understood to be a verification system covering all nuclear fuel cycle facilities and not only fissile material, but also other nuclear materials. On the other hand, the focused approach concentrates on enrichment and reprocessing facilities and fissile material in downstream facilities. This latter approach may cover R&D laboratories, including hot cells with a capability for the separation of fissile material.
23. With regard to the verification system, whether a comprehensive approach should be taken or a focused approach will be an optimum solution is an important but difficult question. In order to find an answer to this question, it will be necessary to consider factors such as security benefits, confidentiality, effectiveness of verification and cost-efficiency.
24. The negotiators will also be able to benefit greatly from the experiences of the IAEA in the consideration of possible key components of a FMCT verification system. The scope of declarations and routine inspections will be discussed in the light of the examinations of fissile material. The issue of non-routine inspections is important because such inspections are one means to detect undeclared activities.
25. The IAEA Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) has already introduced verification arrangements (expanded declaration and complementary access) for the detection of undeclared activities, and such a set of measures should be considered as one of the pillars of verification.
26. It is basically considered that IAEA safeguards measures provided by both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol will provide a good basis for the considerations of a future verification system for "banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Therefore, additional obligations should not, in principle, be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States which adopt both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
27. FMCT verification will also deal with military facilities that have been producing fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, whether exclusively for such purposes or for dual purposes with non-proscribed purposes. IAEA Safeguards are not applied to such facilities. The concept of managed access will be relevant in order to ensure that the issue of confidentiality be duly addressed, particularly with respect to such military or dual-use facilities.
28. Reactor fuel for naval vessels, including military ones, is for non-explosive purposes, and therefore the production of such fuel should not be prohibited. However, difficulties lie in the verification of non-diversion of such material to explosive purposes because confidentiality of the production process of fuel for military vessels is so high that the normal verification approach may not be applicable.



### **Other Verification Issues**

29. Another question is whether or not the FMCT verification should also be tasked to ensure irreversibility with respect to closed-down reprocessing or enrichment facilities for weapon purposes and to fissile material declared as excess.

## **IV. Organization and Legal Issues**

### **Future Organization**

30. The FMCT requires a body to implement verification. There is an advantage to using existing expertise and knowledge of the IAEA, and its robust infrastructure, including administration and equipment of the IAEA. Best utilization of the already existing expertise and infrastructure will save administrative costs and reduce financial burdens on States parties. In any circumstances, the relationship between the implementing organization for the FMCT and the IAEA should be clearly defined.

### **The Entry-Into-Force Clause**

31. The entry-into-force clause is a sensitive issue. Lessons can be learned from the history of the CTBT that has a very high requirement for entry-into-force. At the same time, ratifications by the recognized five nuclear weapon States and those States non-party to the NPT are essential for the operation of the FMCT.

### **Other Provisions**

32. The FMCT should also have provisions, such as (a) amendment, (b) withdrawal, (c) review process, (d) depositary, (e) accession and (f) languages, as do other multilateral arms control conventions and treaties. Depending upon the prospective for an early entry into force of the FMCT, provisions regarding arrangements before the Treaty enters into force, such as hosting facilitating entry-into-force conferences may also be included in the Treaty provisions. Financial arrangements should also be discussed.

## **V. Conclusion**

33. Given the diversity and complexity of the issues of the FMCT, negotiations require extensive technical expertise as well as difficult political judgements. It is an urgent priority to resolve the stalemate in the CD and to commence FMCT negotiations with a view to their conclusion within five years.

34. The structuring of the debate on the FMCT can be categorized into three items, namely scope, technical deliberations including verification issues and organizational and legal issues. And, for the sake of future negotiation, these can be factorized and further recomposed to: (a) group for legal and political issues; and (b) group for technical issues.

35. The Shannon mandate is clear in seeking a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and in precluding fissile



material for peaceful purposes from the scope of the prohibition. This question should not be reopened.

36. Negotiations should involve substantial technical deliberations focused on *future production*. Through such deliberations, a verification system will be elaborated. Any tactics to link the banning of future production with the issue of existing stocks will unnecessarily prolong negotiations and is harmful to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. An argument that technical issues cannot be dealt with until the scope of the Treaty is determined is not viable.

37. With regard to the verification system, whether a comprehensive approach should be taken or a focused approach will be an optimum solution is an important but difficult question. In order to find an answer to this question, it will be necessary to consider factors such as security benefits, confidentiality, effectiveness of verification and cost-efficiency.

38. It is basically considered that IAEA safeguards measures provided by both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol will provide a good basis for the considerations of a future verification system for "banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Therefore, additional obligations should not, in principle, be imposed on non-nuclear-weapon States which adopt both the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

39. Given the complexity of the technical deliberations, the idea to establish a group of experts, similar to the one established for technical work on the verification of the CTBT, may merit serious consideration in order to prepare a common knowledge ground for future negotiations.

40. In order to facilitate negotiations on the FMCT verification system, it would be beneficial to make full use of past experience, expertise, and infrastructure of the IAEA to an extent comparable with the scope and aim of the FMCT. Organizational matters should also be discussed in terms of the potentiality for the FMCT verification system to become the future organization to verify nuclear disarmament and ultimately underpin the nuclear-weapon-free world.

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## 共同報道発表

日本と米国は、日本の安全及びアジア太平洋地域の平和と安全を維持するため、両国の間の強固な安全保障同盟を強化することを強く決意している。両国は、沖縄における米軍の影響を軽減するとともに、普天間飛行場の代替施設をキャンプ・シュワブ辺野古崎地区及びこれに隣接する水域に建設することに引き続きコミットしている。両国は、普天間飛行場の代替施設に関する現在の計画が、唯一の有効な進め方であると信じている。

両国は、グアムが、沖縄から移転される海兵隊員を含め機動的な海兵隊のプレゼンスを持つ戦略的な拠点として発展することが、日米同盟におけるアジア太平洋戦略の不可欠な要素であり続けることを強調する。

米国は、地理的により分散し、運用面でより抗堪性があり、かつ、政治的により持続可能な米軍の態勢を地域において達成するために、アジアにおける防衛の態勢に関する戦略的な見直しを行ってきた。日本はこのイニシアティブを歓迎する。

このような共同の努力の一環として、両国政府は、再編のロードマップに示されている現行の態勢に関する計画の調整について、特に、海兵隊のグアムへの移転及びその結果として生ずる嘉手納以南の土地の返還の双方を普天間飛行場の代替施設に関する進展から切り離すことについて、公式な議論を開始した。両国は、グアムに移転する海兵隊の部隊構成及び人数についても見直しを行っているが、最終的に沖縄に残留する海兵隊のプレゼンスは、再編のロードマップに沿ったものとなることを引き続き確保していく。

今後数週間ないし数か月の間に、両国政府は、このような調整を行う際の複数の課題に取り組むべく作業を行っていく。この共同の努力は、日米同盟の戦略目標を進展させるものであり、また、アジア太平洋地域における平和と安全の維持のための日米共通のヴィジョンを反映したものである。

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## United States - Japan Joint Statement on Defense Posture

## Media Note

Washington, DC

February 8, 2012

Following is the text of a joint statement by the United States and Japan released on February 8, 2012, in Washington, D.C and Tokyo:

## Begin Text:

The United States and Japan are strongly committed to strengthening our robust security alliance, which is dedicated to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. We remain committed to mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on Okinawa, as well as to the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters. We believe that the current Futenma Replacement Facility plan is the only viable way forward.

Both sides underscore that the development of Guam as a strategic hub, with an operational Marine Corps presence including Marines relocated from Okinawa, remains an essential part of the Alliance's Asia-Pacific Strategy.

The United States has conducted a strategic review of its defense posture in Asia in order to achieve a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable force structure in the region. Japan welcomes this initiative.

As part of this joint effort our two governments have started official discussions to adjust our current posture plans set forth in the Realignment Roadmap, in particular delinking both the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. We are also reviewing the unit composition and the number of Marines who will relocate to Guam and we continue to be committed to achieving an end-state Marine presence remaining on Okinawa in line with the Roadmap.

In the weeks and months ahead, our two governments will be working to address a number of issues associated with these adjustments. This joint effort advances the strategic objectives of the Alliance and reflects our shared vision for the maintenance of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.